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falsifying employment applications to obtain jobs in violation of
railroad safety requirements. The Rock doctrine might never have
arisen if the fraud perpetrated by Rock had not been so outrageous
as to shock the sensibility of the Supreme Court. Minneapolis St.
P. & Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, supra; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.
Ry. v. Borum, supra. Despite the public protection basis for the
doctrine it has been urged that application of the doctrine will have
no effect in deterring job applicants from making false statements
to gain employment. Merrill, Misrepresentationto Secure Employment, 14 MINN. L. REv. 646 (1930).
It is clear that the Rock doctrine actually has had little effect
in advancing the public policy which it was intended to support.
Evidence of this failure can be found in the many cases which have
arisen since the Rock decision where fraud in the employment contract has been introduced as a defense. The decision has failed to
provide an adequate standard for the courts to follow when applying
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and has served
only to confuse the application of a clear policy stated by Congress
in that act.
Herbert Stephenson Boreman, Jr.
Sales-Additional Responsibility of Manufacturers-New Car Sales
P purchased a new car from a dealer which was destroyed by
fire ten days after purchase. P contended that it was caused by
faulty wiring and sued both the dealer and the manufacturer for
the damage to the car. The lower court directed a verdict for both
Ds, but the Supreme Court of Iowa held that in spite of an express
warranty which limited liability, the case could go to the jury against
both Ds on an implied warranty theory. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N:W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961).
This recent case illustrates a line of decisions which gives the
purchaser of a new automobile some protection from the common
law doctrine of "caveat emptor." Many car dealers are selling new
cars with a uniform warranty and disclaimer which gives a purchaser
very little protection against mechanical defects. This line of cases
disregards the disclaimer and gives the purchaser the right to sue
on an implied warranty theory.
From a position of almost total immunity from suit the manufacturer now finds himself in quite a different position. It was origi-
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nally possible for the producer to send out a dealer to sell his product,
and use the defense of lack of privity of contract against an ultimate consumer who was injured by the product. The first suits
allowed against manufacturers were based on the theory of negligence,
but this was difficult to prove and was of little value to the consumer. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 389, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916). Many jurisdictions still follow the view that the suit
must be based on privity of contract or negligence. Blitzstein v. Ford
Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961); Levitt v. Ford Motor Co.,
215 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Prince v. Smith, 154 N.C. 768,
119 S.E.2d 923 (1961); Harrisv. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equipment Co., 121 S.E.2d 471 (Va. 1961). The latest view has been
that a warranty is implied and it does not have to be based on
privity of contract. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii
1961); Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Appleman v. Fabert Motors, Inc., 30 III. App. 424, 174 N.E.2d
892 (1961).
The principal case suggests that the thinking in the area of
implied warranties is going even further. Not only would the Iowa
court allow recovery on an implied warranty, but it would also allow
recovery where there is an expressed warranty and a disclaimer of
other liability. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960); GeneralMotors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d
655 (Tenn. 1960). The Washington court in Norway v. Root, 361
P.2d 162 (Wash. 1961) has approved the reasoning behind these
two cases.
Before a suit can be maintained for breach of implied warranty
where there is an express warranty and a disclaimer of other warranty, the courts must concede, first, that an ultimate consumer
does not need privity of contract in order to sue the manufacturer;
second, that an express warranty and an implied warranty can
co-exist as long as their provisions are not inconsistent; and third,
that the disclaimer clause contained in the uniform new car warranty
is void as it is against public policy. The third concession seems
to be the most difficult for the courts to make. In the Dodson case,
supra, and in the principal case the courts seem to have ignored
this problem altogether. Other jurisdictions have refused to declare
such a provision in the sales contract void. Shafer v. Rea Motors,
Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 237 S.C. 133, 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960).
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In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra, the court
justified its decision in light of the disclaimer. Mainly for this reason
the Bloomfield case seems destined to become the leading case in
this area. This decision is also an extensive study of the subject of
implied warranties in the sale of new automobiles, especially in the
light of new marketing practices. The court said that the Uniform
Sales Act codified, extended, and liberalized the common law of
sales, because of the need to lessen the effect of the doctrine of
"ccaveat emptor" and to place some responsibility on the seller. The
court also considered the complete dependence of the buyer upon
the manufacturer of the new car, and the necessity of buying with
the uniform warranty that many car producers include in their sales
contracts.
This additional responsibility on the manufacturer seems to result from the fact that it is impossible for the individual consumer
to bargain on equal terms with the large producers. Since the biggest
producers all insist on the uniform warranty it is almost impossible
to buy on any other terms. The individual cannot intelligently buy
products which are too difficult to examine easily, or which are
too difficult to even understand. These courts have realized that
the doctrine of "caveat emptor" is unrealistic in today's technical
and complex world. Additional inroads may be made into the manufacturer's safety from suit by the extension of the implied warranty
to cover the producer's advertising claims. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co., supra; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Frantz Equipment Co. v.
Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952); Norway v.
Root, supra.
West Virginia has in the past recognized implied warranties.
Comment, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 326 (1961). The court has indicated,
at least by dicta, that it would follow the view that an express
warranty and an implied warranty can exist together as long as
they are not inconsistent. Hill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121
W. Va. 554, 4 S:E. d 793 (1939). Also, by dicta, the West Virginia
court has said that a disclaimer against public policy should be disallowed. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F.
Supp. 122 (S.D. W. Va. 1953); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Hines, 85
W. Va. 405, 102 S.E. 106 (1920). This does not mean that the
West Virginia court would agree with the line of cases that have
said the disclaimer in new car contracts is void, but it may be a
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necessary step before that result could be reached. There are also
statements in a federal case in West Virginia which would indicate
that a manufacturer could be sued on a warranty without privity of
contract. Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1956). These
are the three concessions mentioned before which are necessary to
arrive at the same decisions which the New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Iowa courts have reached. The authority is too sketchy to believe
that the West Virginia court is ready to follow these cases at this
time. But it would not seem like such a large step for West Virginia
to join this group some time in the future.
The trend to hold manufacturers liable on this type of implied
warranty situation will probably not be widely adopted for many
years. But under the conditions of our complex society, a continued
swing away from the doctrine of "caveat emptor" seems inevitable.
Robert Glenn Steele
Torts-Parent and Child-Parent Liable for Tort of Child Where
Parent Negligent in Failing to Restrain Child
P, a minor, was injured due to an assault and battery by minor
son of D. The trial court sustained a general demurrer by D. Held,
reversed. The complaint stated a cause of action on the theory
that the parent (D) had full knowledge of previous similar acts by
minor son, and D failed to exercise reasonable parental discipline
to restrain such malicious conduct, thereby ratifying it. Bieker v.
Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522 (Ark. 1961).
In recent years the rate of juvenile delinquency has been rising
at an alarming pace. With the advent of many malicious torts by
minors, the injured parties have sought recovery from the parents
of such minors for the obvious reason that such minors seldom
have appreciable estates of their own. The theories upon which
recovery is sought are limited. The principal case represents the
view that the parent is liable, not for the child's tort, but for his own
tort of negligence in failing to restrain his child from committing
such torts if he has knowledge of his child's vicious propensities and
fails to exercise reasonable parental control.
A well-recognized rule at common law is that a parent is not
liable for the torts of his child by reason of the parent-child relationship alone. White v. Seitz, 342 Mll. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1930);
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